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Abstract
Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for the importance of doing sci-
entifically- and socially-engaged work, suggesting that we need to reduce barriers 
to extra-disciplinary engagement and broaden our impact. Yet, we currently lack 
empirical data to inform these discussions, leaving a number of important questions 
unanswered. How common is it for philosophers of science to engage other com-
munities, and in what ways are they engaging? What barriers are most prevalent 
when it comes to broadly disseminating one’s work or collaborating with others? 
To what extent do philosophers of science actually value an engaged approach? Our 
project addresses this gap in our collective knowledge by providing empirical data 
regarding the state of philosophy of science today. We report the results of a survey 
of 299 philosophers of science about their attitudes towards and experiences with 
engaging those outside the discipline. Our data suggest that a significant majority of 
philosophers of science think it is important for non-philosophers to read and make 
use of their work; most are engaging with communities outside the discipline; and 
many think philosophy of science, as a discipline, has an obligation to ensure it has 
a broader impact. Interestingly, however, many of these same philosophers believe 
engaged work is generally undervalued in the discipline. We think these findings 
call for cautious optimism on the part of those who value engaged work—while 
there seems to be more interest in engaging other communities than many assume, 
significant barriers still remain.
Keywords Engaged philosophy of science · Dissemination · Collaboration · 
Interdisciplinarity · Barriers · Survey
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1 Introduction
Philosophers of science are increasingly advocating for and undertaking work that 
is not only relevant to scientific and other communities but actually engages with 
those outside the discipline. This growing attention to engaged work is evidenced 
by a number of factors, including special journal issues devoted to the topic (Plai-
sance and Fehr 2010; Cartieri and Potochnik 2014), books that address the need for 
more engaged approaches (e.g., Kourany 2010; Frodeman and Briggle 2016) and 
the emergence of groups like the International Consortium of Socially Engaged Phi-
losophy of/in Science and Engineering (SRPoiSE), the Joint Caucus for Socially 
Engaged Philosophers and Historians of Science (JCSEPHS), and the Public Philos-
ophy Network (PPN), all of which include extra-disciplinary engagement as part of 
their mission. As those who have been involved in this work can attest, philosophy 
of science has the potential to significantly improve scientific practice, science pol-
icy, and public understanding of science. Furthermore, taking an engaged approach 
to one’s work (e.g., collaborating with scientists) can also enable philosophers to 
identify new avenues of inquiry and improve the quality of philosophical work itself 
(Douglas 2010; Fehr and Plaisance 2010). However, philosophers of science who 
are interested in engaging other communities often express concerns about the bar-
riers to disseminating their work more broadly and collaborating with others. If we 
cannot get our scientifically- and socially-relevant work into the hands of those who 
can use it, then we are seriously limiting the impact of our knowledge and miss-
ing important opportunities to influence other communities and enhance scientific 
research and its applications.
While some of the concerns about the barriers to engagement have been discussed 
in print (e.g., Fehr and Plaisance 2010), most have arisen in informal venues, such as 
conferences and workshops, making it difficult to critically assess and advance these 
types of discussions. Furthermore, the publications that directly address these issues 
are typically based on personal experience (Thagard 2006; Dennett 2009) or anecdo-
tal data from a select few (Plaisance and Fehr 2010). In other words, we have little 
empirical data about the actual attitudes, experiences, and values of philosophers of 
science with respect to engaged work.1 This gap in our collective knowledge is both 
a practical problem and an epistemological one. Practically speaking, we need to 
understand the challenges philosophers face when trying to engage other communi-
ties and/or increase the broader impact of their work, especially if we wish to culti-
vate actionable knowledge that can be used to overcome those challenges. Epistemo-
logically, we lack a comprehensive understanding of how knowledge in philosophy 
of science is and could be mobilized across disciplinary boundaries. This paper 
begins to address these gaps by providing empirical data on the views and expe-
riences of philosophers of science working in the field today. (Notably, this study 
1 An important exception to this, which we discuss towards the end of the paper, is a recent study by 
Valerie Tiberius on the value and “well-being” of philosophy (Tiberius 2017). In addition, Turri (2016) 
and Frodeman (2013) conducted surveys of philosophers and philosophy departments, respectively, 
though neither asked philosophers about their experiences with or attitudes towards engaged work.
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was conducted by a team of researchers that included philosophers of science and 
social scientists. This collaborative approach enabled us to ensure that the methodol-
ogy was appropriate for studying philosophy of science while also meeting rigorous 
standards of quantitative research.)
In this paper, we report the results of a survey of 299 philosophers of science. Our 
aim is to develop a statistical portrait of the field in terms of its members’ attitudes, 
experiences, and views about the appropriate goals and approaches for philosophy 
of science as a discipline, especially regarding engaged work. Rather than speculate 
as to whether those taking an engaged approach are in the minority or what sorts 
of barriers they commonly face (as others have done), we asked philosophers of 
science directly. This allowed us to provide answers to the following questions: To 
what extent do philosophers of science think it is important for scientists—or others 
outside philosophy—to read and/or make use of their work? What percentage have 
actually tried to disseminate their work to scientific domains, and to what extent do 
they think those efforts have been successful? How common is it for philosophers 
of science to collaborate across disciplines or even with those outside of academia? 
What barriers or challenges have philosophers of science encountered in trying to 
engage other communities? Do some experience more significant barriers than oth-
ers? To what extent do philosophers of science think engaged work is—and should 
be—valued by the discipline?
The emerging picture from our survey suggests that a majority of philosophers of 
science are interested in and think the discipline ought to value work that engages 
communities outside the discipline. In particular, almost every respondent reported 
that it is at least somewhat important to them that scientists read or make use of their 
work; most report having tried to disseminate their work to scientific communities 
or science policymakers; and many have collaborated in a variety of ways (e.g., over 
half had co-authored a peer-reviewed paper with a scientist).2 While we expected 
there to be significant interest in and experience with engaging scientific communi-
ties, we were surprised by how high these numbers actually were. We conducted a 
statistical analysis of the data (using multiple regression) to determine whether key 
demographic variables accounted for any variation in responses. We found a few dif-
ferences in responses based on gender, career stage, area of philosophy of science, 
and amount of scientific training. One of the main areas where differences arose was 
with respect to the barriers participants faced in doing engaged work. Interestingly, 
we found that perceived barriers were significantly higher than actual reported bar-
riers for every barrier we listed. As we discuss below, this may suggest that, in some 
cases at least, barriers may not be as significant as some assume they are. However, 
since perceived barriers can become actual barriers, having a better understanding 
of the barriers that do and do not exist is crucial for determining what actions to 
take, both individually and collectively.
2 Our survey asked participants about their views towards engaging scientific communities, policymak-
ers, lay communities, and others; however, given the large amount of data we collected, we primarily 
focus on responses related to scientifically-engaged work in this paper. Where appropriate, we also report 
responses related to other types of engaged work, especially to demonstrate relative interests and experi-
ences with respect to such work.
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Of course, survey data alone do not give us a complete picture—they do not 
allow us to unpack individuals’ experiences or identify causal relationships between 
particular conditions (e.g., one’s institutional context) and outcomes (e.g., perceived 
success in influencing scientific practice). Because of this inherent limitation of 
quantitative data, our research team also designed a qualitative study as part of our 
larger research project. The qualitative aspect includes in-depth interviews with a 
number of philosophers of science to better understand the types of challenges they 
face in engaging other communities, how they have overcome those challenges, and 
what sorts of evidence they point to when asked about the broader impacts of their 
work. We report the results of that research elsewhere (Plaisance et al. 2019), though 
we do mention some of our qualitative findings below to provide context for the sur-
vey data. Furthermore, knowing that both surveys and interviews rely on self-report, 
our project also includes a bibliometric study of the citation patterns of philosophy 
of science articles in order to better understand broader uptake of philosophical 
work (McLevey et al. 2018).
We believe this research can be useful in a number of ways. First of all, having 
rigorously-collected empirical data provides us with a much more informed picture 
of the discipline. In some cases, this picture is different from the one portrayed in 
discussions about the value of engaged work. While some philosophers have stipu-
lated that extra-disciplinary engagement is in the minority, our data suggest that it 
is not as uncommon as many seem to believe. Second, even for particular findings 
that may be unsurprising, having data allows us to be more confident about our per-
ceptions. Our hope is that the picture we describe here will give junior scholars a 
better sense of what most philosophers of science think and do with respect to sci-
entifically- and socially-engaged work, as well as what barriers they might face if 
they try to disseminate their work more broadly or collaborate with others outside 
the discipline. (Our interview data offer more details about nature of those barriers, 
including their context-dependent nature and ways they can be overcome.) It should 
also be of interest to more established philosophers of science, either for thinking 
through their own approach or for enhancing their understanding of the field in a 
way that may help them when mentoring or supervising junior scholars. Finally, this 
project is also relevant to philosophers more generally, including those who do not 
wish to engage extra-disciplinary communities themselves. While we certainly do 
not think an engaged approach should be the only one, nor is it necessarily better or 
more valuable than more traditional work in philosophy of science, we do think it 
would benefit the discipline to support scholars who are trying to bring philosophi-
cal work to bear on scientific practice, science policy, or public understanding of 
science.
2  Data and methods
2.1  Survey development and recruitment
The results presented in this paper are based on an analysis of an online survey of phi-
losophers of science that we conducted in 2016 and 2017. To ensure our methodology 
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was in line with rigorous social science methods, we developed a “sampling frame” of 
philosophers of science—i.e., a comprehensive list of individuals who might identify 
as a philosopher of science—by obtaining names and affiliations from three sources. 
The first consisted of membership lists for the Philosophy of Science Association 
(PSA), the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), and the European 
Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA). Second, we used the Python package 
metaknowledge (McLevey and McIlroy-Young 2017) to identify author names from 
Ph.D. dissertations in philosophy of science located in the Proquest Dissertations and 
Theses database. Third, we collected names and affiliations for everyone who had 
published two or more articles in any of the following seven journals: Philosophy of 
Science, The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Phi-
losophy of Science (Parts A, B, & C), Synthese, European Journal for Philosophy of 
Science, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, and International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science. We selected these journals based on consultations with phi-
losophers of science who are well-established in the field. In addition, this list of jour-
nals aligns well with those reported in Wray (2010), “Philosophy of Science: What 
are the Key Journals in the Field?” Wray also included Erkentnnis and The Journal of 
Philosophy; however, we chose not to include these journals as they are more geared 
towards a general philosophy audience, and we wanted to restrict the sample to philos-
ophers of science as much as possible.3 Knowing that at least some of the individuals 
we included would not identify as philosophers of science (given that historians of sci-
ence, sociologists of science, and even scientists themselves occasionally publish work 
in these journals), we included a question on the survey, “do you identify as a philoso-
pher of science?” Respondents were given three options: ‘yes’, ‘to some extent’, and 
‘no’. Only the results of those who answered ‘yes’ or ‘to some extent’ are included in 
the results reported below.
Recruiting participants using a sampling frame has a number of advantages. 
Unlike other approaches (e.g., circulating a link to the survey on mailing lists or 
posting a link on a website or blog), constructing this frame enables us to calcu-
late a response rate and identify potential systematic biases in our responses. In this 
case, our response rate for the membership-based sampling frame was 9.7%, which 
is comparable to response rates for other digital surveys (and possibly a bit higher 
given the length of the survey).4 Participation was voluntary and respondents were 
not compensated. In terms of systematic bias, we suspect that non-tenured profes-
sors are underrepresented in our sample (see Sect.  2.3 for further discussion of 
3 One of the reasons for using a more restrictive set of journals is that the views and experiences of those 
who identify as philosophers of science may be substantially different from those who identify as other 
types of philosophers, and our main aim was to understand how philosophers of science view engaged 
work and what sorts of barriers they face in disseminating their work to audiences outside philosophy.
4 The response rate was considerably lower for the larger sampling frame, which included anyone 
who authored or co-authored a paper in one of the seven journals any time since their inception. Those 
authors include many researchers who are not philosophers, philosophers of science who are deceased, 
and many who published as graduate students but did not stay in academia (and thus were more difficult 
to track down). Thus, we think the response rate for the membership-based sampling frame is a better 
rate to use.
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possible sampling biases). However, we are unable to compute the extent to which 
that is actually the case, as our sampling frame does not include sufficient informa-
tion about academic appointments or career status.
The survey instrument was developed by the two philosophers of science on the 
research team, in consultation with the two sociologists who have expertise in survey 
methodology. After pilot testing the survey with several faculty and graduate stu-
dents who identify as philosophers of science, we linked it to the names and emails 
in our sampling frame and launched the survey (using LimeSurvey). The survey had 
five main sections: (1) career-relevant information about each participant, (2) inter-
est in and experience with disseminating work outside philosophy, (3) interest in 
and experience with collaborating with others (especially with non-philosophers), 
(4) views about the goals and obligations of philosophy of science as a discipline, 
and (5) demographic information. Most of the survey questions in sections (2), (3), 
and (4) were Likert-type  scale questions, with some opportunities for open-ended 
responses.
In the first section, we asked participants about their professional background. 
This included questions about the type of philosophy of science they do (e.g., gen-
eral philosophy of science, feminist philosophy of science, philosophy of biology), 
the institution from which they earned or are earning their Ph.D., the year they 
earned or expect to earn their Ph.D., their current position (e.g., graduate student, 
adjunct, tenure-track faculty member), and the amount of education or training they 
have received in a scientific field. In section two, we asked participants to rate how 
important it was to them that other communities read or make use of their work, 
whether they had tried to disseminate their work to scientific communities, to what 
extent they thought their dissemination efforts were successful, and what sorts of 
barriers they faced. We also asked how much they thought philosophy of science, 
as a discipline, values extra-disciplinary dissemination as well as how much they 
thought it should be valued. The third section focused on collaboration. We asked 
participants to rate how interested they were in collaborating with a variety of indi-
viduals or communities (e.g., other philosophers, scientific researchers, policymak-
ers), the various ways they had collaborated with others, and how often they had 
engaged in such collaborations. As with the section on dissemination, we also asked 
about barriers they had experienced and their perceptions of the extent to which the 
discipline values and rewards collaborations (with scientists in particular). Section 
four included questions about the goals and obligations that participants thought 
philosophy of science, as a discipline, ought to have. Finally, we had participants 
provide key demographic information, such as gender and ethnicity, so we could 
determine whether particular factors might be associated with variation in responses 
and to assess representativeness of our sample.
2.2  Participant demographics
As noted above, we received complete responses from 299 philosophers of science. 
The statistical details of professional backgrounds and demographic variables are 
reported in Table 1.
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Table 1  Participant 
demographics n %
Identifies as a philosopher of science
  Yes 188 62.9
  To some extent 111 37.1
Type of philosophy of science
  General philosophy of science 203 30.7
  Feminist philosophy of science 23 3.5
  Philosophy of biology 79 12.0
  Philosophy of chemistry 18 2.8
  Philosophy of medicine 32 4.8
  Philosophy of physics 91 13.8
  Philosophy of psychology 56 8.5
  Philosophy of social science 57 8.6
  Other 102 15.4
Current position
  Tenured faculty member 181 60.7
  Tenure-track faculty member 24 8.1
  Postdoctoral fellow 17 5.7
  Contract/adjunct faculty 9 3.0
  Independent scholar 8 2.7
  Has a Ph.D. and is seeking a TT position 2 0.7
  Graduate student 9 3.0
  Non-academic job 11 3.7
  Retired faculty member 28 9.4
  Other 9 3.0
Science training
  Ph.D. in a scientific field 50 16.9
  Master’s degree in a scientific field 61 20.6
  Undergraduate degree in a scientific field 63 21.3
  Undergraduate minor in a scientific field 18 6.1
  Some science courses 73 24.7
  Informal training 15 5.1
  No training 8 2.7
Gender
  Female 57 19.5
  Male 231 79.1
  Another gender identity 4 1.4
Ethnicity
  Asian 5 1.7
  Black 1 0.3
  Indigenous 1 0.3
  Latina/Latino or Hispanic 12 4.0
  Middle Eastern 7 2.3
  White/Caucasian 268 89.6
  Other 13 4.4
LGBTQ+
  Identify as LGBTQ+ 17 6.1
  Do not identify as LGBTQ+ 255 91.7
  Prefer not to say 6 2.2
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We received responses from philosophers of science who work in a variety of 
areas, including general philosophy of science, feminist philosophy of science, and 
several areas in philosophy of the “special sciences”. It was interesting to see that 
over one-third of respondents have a master’s or doctoral degree in a scientific field 
and over half have at least an undergraduate degree in a scientific field. In terms of 
demographics, the sample was overwhelmingly white and male, in line with what 
we see in the discipline more generally.
2.3  Limitations of our sample
One of the limitations of our study is that it is difficult to precisely determine the 
representativeness of our sample, especially given the lack of other surveys with 
which to compare it.5 The best way of assessing representativeness was by com-
paring the demographics of our sample with the most recent data from a survey of 
Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) members (Gender distributions among 
Philosophy of Science Association members 2014). However, the only factor both 
surveys examined was gender (the PSA survey asked about gender and salary). In 
the PSA report, 17% of respondents identified as female and 82.7% as male, while 
in our survey, 19.5% of respondents identified as female and 79.1% as male (1.4% 
reported another gender identity and 2.3% did not provide an answer).6 Thus, the 
gender demographics of our survey seem to be representative of other data about 
members of the discipline and in fact may slightly overrepresent female philoso-
phers of science (alternatively, the PSA data may underrepresent them).
With respect to career stage, the representativeness of our survey sample seems 
mixed. In our sample, 60.7% of respondents were tenured faculty members and 
only 8.1% were tenure-track (others were graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, 
adjuncts, retired faculty, or were employed outside academia). Since the PSA report 
did not include data about career stage, we compared our sample with data from 
the American Philosophical Association (APA). According to a recent APA report, 
61.5% of the membership were tenured faculty and 18.8% were tenure-track fac-
ulty members in 2017 (Demographic statistics on the APA membership, FY2016 to 
FY2018 2019). On the one hand, this suggests that our survey is representative when 
it comes to tenured faculty, but not tenure-track faculty. However, there are two 
other possibilities. First, both the APA data and our survey data may overrepresent 
tenured faculty as those who are tenured may be more likely both to become official 
APA members and respond to our survey. Second, there could be more tenure-track 
faculty in philosophy than in philosophy of science such that both surveys are actu-
ally representative of both communities. In any case, we believe our survey may 
5 Frodeman (2013) surveyed departments rather than individuals and thus doesn’t provide demographic 
data. Turri (2016) asked about gender but not rank. Tiberius (2017) doesn’t include demographic infor-
mation in her paper (she provides it an a separate report, but we decided not to use that data as it was 
unpublished at the time of this writing).
6 Turri (2016) surveyed philosophers more generally:16.6% of his respondents identified as female and 
81.3% as male.
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underrepresent junior scholars. Our main concern with this possible lack of repre-
sentativeness is with respect to the barriers to broader dissemination and collabora-
tion that we asked about. Our own statistical analyses indicate that those without 
tenure face more significant barriers such as lack of recognition for the purposes of 
tenure and promotion. To address this issue, we indicate whether there are differ-
ences between groups (including between tenured and non-tenured respondents) for 
each of the findings we report below. This makes it easier for readers to see where 
the lack of representativeness with respect to a particular demographic variable, 
such as career stage, may be playing a role in skewing the results.
Finally, there may be a selection effect in our sample, where those who value 
engaged philosophy of science may have been more likely to respond to the survey 
and those who think it is unimportant may have been less likely to do so. If such 
a selection bias occurred, then some of the figures we report may be inflated (for 
example, the reported proportions of philosophers of science who have co-authored 
with scientists may be higher than the actual proportions). We tried to minimize self-
selection by not using terms like “engaged” or “socially relevant” in our recruitment 
materials, though we did describe the survey as part of “a study on the relationship 
between philosophy of science and the sciences.” We caution readers to keep these 
limitations in mind when reading the rest of the paper.
2.4  Statistical analysis
For the majority of statistical tests, we used multiple regression to examine the 
strength and significance of the relationships between potential predictors (e.g., 
gender) and the outcome variable (e.g., reported barriers).7 Regressions are gener-
ally understood in terms of their regression coefficients. The basic interpretation for 
regression coefficients is as follows: for a 1-unit increase in variable X, we expect 
to see a change in the outcome variable Y equal to the regression coefficient for X. 
Take, for example, the level of science training that a philosopher of science has 
acquired (e.g., an undergraduate degree vs. a master’s degree vs. a Ph.D. in a scien-
tific field) and their desire to work with scientists. In that case, a value of 0.5 would 
indicate that an increase in science training comparable to the change between an 
undergraduate and master’s degree in a scientific field predicts a half-point shift in 
desire to collaborate with scientists (halfway between “no desire” and “some desire” 
for example). Similarly, philosophers of science with a Ph.D. in a scientific disci-
pline would be expected to answer a half-point higher than those with a master’s 
degree, and 1.0 points higher than those with an undergraduate degree in a scientific 
discipline. In our Findings section, we report the results of our statistical analysis in 
terms of effect sizes (denoted by ‘B’).
There are five variables we thought might account for variation in responses, 
and thus five independent variables in our models: gender, career stage, amount of 
7 In preparation for the statistical analysis, responses were coded on a numeric scale, with the most nega-
tive response being 1 and each gradation being one higher. This allowed us to include such responses in 
our regressions and will help explain the interpretation of the results.
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scientific training, area of philosophy of science (general philosophy of science vs. 
philosophy of the “special sciences”), and whether or not one identifies as a femi-
nist philosopher of science. By including all these variables in our models, we were 
able to identify correlations that are not confounded by the other variables we exam-
ined. For instance, if our data show that there are statistically significant differences 
between participants who identify as feminist philosophers of science and those who 
don’t, but no differences according to gender, then the differences associated with 
being a feminist philosopher of science are not attributable to the fact that there are 
likely more women who identify as such. Notably, while some of these variables 
were correlated with others, none of them were highly correlated (in other words, 
we didn’t have multicollinearity, which would make  it difficult to tease apart the 
contributions of the different variables). Interestingly, gender and career stage were 
not correlated at all.
For each of our models, we did additional analyses to determine if the model 
was a good fit. (Roughly speaking, “good fit” means we can be reasonably confi-
dent that the model accurately captures relationships between the variables. When 
determining which models to report, we excluded those that either violated a key 
assumption or that did not explain much of the variance.) Any statistically signifi-
cant differences—or lack of differences—we report in this paper are from models 
that have good fit; furthermore, we explicitly note when our models did not have 
good fit (such that we were unable to determine whether or not there were differ-
ences between groups). Readers should note that we used p < 0.05 as the threshold 
for statistical significance; however, since we report actual p values below, readers 
who prefer a different threshold can interpret those findings for themselves. For the 
effect sizes, we used unstandardized regression coefficients (denoted by ‘B’ in the 
Findings). Interested readers can find more details about our statistical analyses 
(e.g., how we coded each variable and what criteria we used for model selection) in 
the supplementary appendix (https ://osf.io/8wn6b /).
3  Findings
Below we describe our findings for the three substantive sections of the survey: dis-
semination, collaboration, and goals and obligations. We also report the results of 
the statistical analyses we performed. As noted above, for any differences that we 
found, our models controlled for other factors we thought were likely to play a role, 
which include: gender, career stage, area of philosophy of science, amount of scien-
tific training, and whether or not one identifies as a feminist philosopher of science.
3.1  Dissemination
We began by asking participants to indicate how important it is to them that other 
communities read or use their research. As indicated in Fig. 1, almost all respondents 
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Fig. 1  How important is it to you that other communities read or use your research?
(96.6%) said that it was at least somewhat important that scientific communities 
read their work, with the majority (62.5%) rating it as very important.8 Our statisti-
cal analysis showed that more science training predicted a slightly higher rating of 
importance on this scale (B: 0.066, p < 0.002). Many respondents (63.1%) also said 
it was at least somewhat important to them that policymakers read or make use of 
their work. Again, we found that those who had more science training were slightly 
more likely to say that it was important that policymakers read their work (B: 0.072, 
p < 0.011).
Most respondents were also interested in having lay communities read or use 
their work, with roughly three quarters (76.4%) rating it as at least somewhat impor-
tant. We were not able to determine whether there were differences between groups 
for this question as our statistical model was not a good fit (i.e., we could not be con-
fident that the model was accurately capturing underlying relationships).
Next, we asked participants whether they had tried to disseminate their work to 
scientists (e.g., through presentations at science conferences or publications in sci-
ence journals). Most (83.8%) responded ‘yes’, while a few (16.2%) said ‘no’. The 
communities to which philosophers of science disseminated their work varied 
widely (e.g., biologists, chemists, physicists, artificial intelligence researchers, and 
health professionals). Interestingly, we found statistically significant differences 
between men and women respondents on this question (even after controlling for 
other factors like career stage), where men were much more likely to say they had 
tried to disseminate their work to scientists (B: 2.159, p < 0.045). Those who were 
post-tenure were also much more likely to say they had tried to disseminate their 
work (B: 2.351, p < 0.050). Notably, the effect sizes for gender and career stage 
were quite similar (despite the fact that gender and career stage were not correlated 
with one another). In terms of perceived success, 52.8% thought their dissemination 
efforts were successful, 39.9% thought they were at least a bit successful, and only 
7.3% didn’t think they were successful at all (see Fig. 2). Here, there were no statisti-
cally significant differences between groups. 
8 Note that we only report responses for those who answered the question. For the dissemination section, 
the response rate for each question was 89–98%.
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Almost half of the participants added comments in response to our question about 
the success of their efforts, offering insight into the types of evidence philosophers of 
science consider when assessing the impact of their work. Many of these examples 
suggested uptake of their scholarly work among scientific communities: being asked 
by scientists about their views on a particular topic, having their ideas incorporated 
by scientists in scientists’ future work, noting a positive reception of one’s conference 
talk, receiving an award for their work from a scientific association, being asked by a 
scientist to collaborate on a research project, being invited to write an article for sci-
entific journals like PLOS, and having scientists cite their work. With respect to this 
last category, some participants specifically noted that their papers in science journals 
were the most downloaded or cited of all the papers they had published. One partici-
pant wrote, “my work has received almost as much attention from physicists as from 
philosophers.” Some participants also mentioned the broader impact of their work 
via their teaching or service commitments. For example, one person noted science 
students’ interest in how concepts from philosophy of science relate to the nature of 
those students’ research questions and methods; another discussed opportunities to 
teach medical professionals, which affected those professionals’ thinking on particu-
lar issues; yet another wrote about being able to provide input on legislation regard-
ing insurance companies’ use of genetic information.9
To get a sense of the types of barriers philosophers of science face when dissem-
inating their work more broadly, we drew on other research (e.g., Fehr and Plaisance 
2010) to create a list of what we thought would be the most likely barriers experienced 
by at least some members of the discipline. We asked those who had tried to broadly dis-
seminate their work to rate the significance of those barriers and list any other barriers 
we may have missed. The barriers we included, in descending order of reported signifi-
cance, were: lack of time, lack of interest on the part of scientists, lack of opportunities/
9 For a detailed discussion of the types of impacts philosophers of science cite, what evidence they use 
to assess it, and what types of pathways are more likely to enhance impact, see Plaisance et al. (2019). 
Notably, a number of philosophers of science we interviewed for that study mentioned the impact they 
have had via teaching, lending support to the idea that many philosophers’ broader impacts likely happen 
through teaching (e.g., Schliesser 2015).
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Do you think your dissemination efforts were successful?
Fig. 2  Do you think your dissemination efforts were successful?
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resources, lack of recognition (for hiring, tenure, promotion, etc.), and lack of skills/
training. Figure 3 shows the responses to each of the five barriers we asked about.
For most of the barriers, we found statistically significant differences among vari-
ous groups. For ‘lack of time’, both women and those who were post-tenure were 
somewhat more likely to say that time was a barrier (for women, B: 0.456, p < 0.002; 
for post-tenure, B: 0.324, p < 0.018). The effect size for gender was slightly larger 
than what we found for participants’ career stage (see Table 2, below, for an over-
view of the various effect sizes). While individuals who did not have tenure were 
less likely to say that time was a barrier, they were much more likely to say that 
lack of recognition (e.g., for hiring, tenure, and promotion) was more of a barrier to 
broadly disseminating their work (B: 0.527, p < 0.0003). This was the largest effect 
size, and the highest level of certainty, for all the differences we identified amongst 
the barriers we asked about. In particular, non-tenure participants responded as fol-
lows: 42.9% said it was a substantial barrier, 28.6% said it was a minor barrier, and 
28.6% said it was not a barrier to disseminating their work more broadly. For post-
tenure participants, the responses were: 13.9% substantial barrier, 33.7% minor bar-
rier, and 52.4% not a barrier. No other variables, such as gender or scientific train-
ing, predicted differences in reporting lack of recognition as a barrier.
Respondents who did not have tenure were also more likely to say that lack of inter-
est on the part of scientists was a barrier to disseminating their work outside of philo-
sophical domains (B: 0.347, p < 0.012). Interestingly, neither science training nor area 
of philosophy of science (general philosophy of science vs. philosophy of the “special 
sciences”) made a difference. Science training did, however, predict whether a partici-
pant thought a lack of skills posed a barrier: not surprisingly, those with more science 
training reported this as less of a barrier (B: − 0.103, p < 0.001). Finally, there were no 
significant differences when it came to lack of opportunities or resources. Table 2 pro-
vides a summary of effect sizes for the statistically significant differences we identified.
A small percentage of respondents (6%) reported additional barriers and described 
them in the comments. One of the main themes that arose from the comments was 
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Lack of interest from scientists
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Have you experienced any of the following barriers 
in disseminating your work beyond philosophy of science?
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Fig. 3  Have you experienced any of the following barriers in disseminating your work beyond philoso-
phy of science?
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difficulties with cross-disciplinary communication. For instance, a few respondents 
cited challenges with understanding and adapting to the writing styles and publishing 
norms of scientific or science policy venues. Another respondent attributed communi-
cation difficulties to philosophers’ lack of training, suggesting that, “Philosophers are 
poorly trained to talk to scientists, policymakers, and the general public. There needs 
to be training in how to do this effectively if we actually think we can communicate 
across the disciplines.” Yet another noted that, among scientists, there is a “lack of 
understanding for what philosophy of science can contribute.”
At the end of the section on dissemination, we asked participants to rate the 
extent to which they thought efforts to broadly disseminate one’s work was actually 
valued and rewarded by the discipline, and the extent to which they thought it ought 
to be valued. Over half (61.8%) thought that such work was ‘generally not valued’ or 
that ‘some value it but it’s generally not rewarded’ (see Fig. 4).
Table 2  Effect Sizes for Between-Group Differences Regarding Barriers to Dissemination
*The effect size for level of science training should be interpreted differently than for the other variables, 
as science training was captured on a 6-point scale, ranging from no training to holding a Ph.D. in a sci-
entific field. The effect size thus captures the result of moving up one gradation with respect to reported 
barriers. In this case, those who held a Ph.D. in a scientific field were much less likely to report lack of 
skills as a barrier compared with those who had no training; the effect size for the difference between 
those groups is − 0.66
Lack of time Lack of 
recogni-
tion
Lack of interest 
from scientists
Lack of skills Lack of 
opportuni-
ties
Career stage (non-tenured) − 0.32 + 0.53 + 0.35
Gender (women) + 0.46
Level of science training − 0.11*
General POS (vs. phil. of 
special sciences)
Feminist philosophy
11.1%
27.1%
47.9%
13.9%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
It's generally valued
Some value it, and it's rewarded
Some value it, but it's not rewarded
It's generally not valued
To what extent do you think philosophy of science, as a discipline, actually 
values and rewards disseminating work outside philosophical domains? 
Fig. 4  To what extent do you think philosophy of science, as a discipline, actually values and rewards 
disseminating work outside philosophical domains?
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Moreover, the majority (81.2%) thought that broader dissemination efforts should 
be valued more (notably, only one person thought it should be valued less than it is; 
see Fig. 5). This was surprising to us—while we expected some participants to say 
that broader dissemination should be valued more than it is, we certainly did not 
expect such a large majority.
Interestingly, we didn’t find any statistically significant differences between 
groups on either of these questions.
3.2  Collaboration
In the section on collaboration, we asked a set of questions similar to those included 
in the dissemination section. In addition, we asked about the various ways partici-
pants have collaborated with others. Overall, the results indicate that many philoso-
phers of science are both substantially interested in and have wide variety of experi-
ence with collaborating with those outside their field.
Participants were first asked about their interest in collaborating with particular indi-
viduals or groups, with the added remark: “by collaboration, we mean things like co-
authoring a publication, co-presenting a conference paper, or being co-PIs on a grant 
proposal.” As Fig. 6 shows, the majority of respondents are at least somewhat interested 
in collaborating with others, including other philosophers of science (95.1%), scientists 
or engineers (93.2%), social scientists (81.3%), and policymakers (68.8%); notably, over 
half were very interested in collaborating with scientists or engineers (64.3%). Both non-
tenured respondents and those who identify as working in the philosophy of the spe-
cial sciences were more likely to be interested in collaborating with scientists or engi-
neers (for non-tenured, B: 0.211, p < 0.023; for philosophy of special sciences, B: 0.224, 
p < 0.045). We did not find any differences when it came to interest in collaborating with 
other philosophers, and our models did not have good fit for the other questions (e.g., 
interest in collaborating with social scientists or policymakers).
Next, we asked participants how often they had actually collaborated with vari-
ous individuals or groups. As Fig. 7 illustrates, the majority of participants (84.9%) 
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81.2%
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To what extent do you think philosophy of science, as a discipline, should 
value and reward disseminating work outside philosophical domains?
Fig. 5  To what extent do you think philosophy of science, as a discipline, should value and reward dis-
seminating work outside philosophical domains?
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have collaborated with other philosophers of science at least once; over half have 
collaborated with scientists or engineers (68.7%) or social scientists (51.5%); and 
a few participants (22.1%) have collaborated with policymakers. It is interesting to 
note that about one-third of participants have collaborated with scientists or engi-
neers six or more times, suggesting that a significant number of philosophers of sci-
ence are involved in frequent collaborations.
Not surprisingly, we found statistically significant differences between tenured 
and non-tenured respondents, where being tenured was associated with more col-
laborations (Bs ranged from 0.28 to 0.60 and p-values from 0.001 to 0.022, depend-
ing on which group of collaborators we were looking at). Since we didn’t control 
for age, this could be explained by the fact that tenured respondents have had longer 
careers than those without tenure and thus more opportunities to collaborate. How-
ever, it is also possible that this difference is due in part to concerns about the nega-
tive consequences of collaboration when it comes to receiving tenure; in fact, as we 
demonstrate below, ‘lack of recognition’ is a more significant barrier for non-tenured 
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Fig. 6  How interested are you in collaborating with the following individuals or groups?
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respondents than it is for those who have the security of tenure. We also found dif-
ferences associated with gender and science training when it came to frequency of 
collaboration. Women collaborated with other philosophers more often than did 
men (B: 0.471, p < 0.019), while those with more science training collaborated 
more often with social scientists (B: 0.104, p < 0.041) and scientists or engineers (B: 
0.245, p < 0.00001) than did those with less science training.
To better understand how philosophers of science engage with scientists or sci-
entific communities, we listed various modes of engagement and asked participants 
to check off any they had done (see Fig.  8). Some of the more common ways of 
engaging were relatively informal (e.g., asking a scientist to provide comments on 
their work), while others involved more formal collaborations (e.g., co-authoring a 
peer-reviewed paper).
Notably, over half (55.9%) of respondents had co-authored a peer-reviewed pub-
lication with a scientist or engineer and just under half (43.8%) had been co-inves-
tigators on a grant.10 We found these numbers to be surprising, especially given the 
typical narrative of philosophy as a solo-authored discipline. While philosophy of 
science may be thought of as a more collaborative enterprise than other areas of phi-
losophy, we did not expect to see that the majority of respondents had actually co-
authored with scientists.11 (Others didn’t expect this either: during our interviews, 
and when presenting this work, we often asked philosophers of science what they 
expected these numbers to be. With one exception, everyone we asked predicted sig-
nificantly lower estimates.)
When it came to more formal types of collaborations (e.g., co-authoring a peer-
reviewed paper or acting as co-PI on a grant), we found that non-tenured respond-
ents were less likely to have collaborated with scientists (for co-authoring, B: 
43.8%
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55.9%
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58.2%
65.2%
66.6%
69.9%
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In which of the following ways have you engaged with scientists?
Fig. 8  In which of the following ways have you engaged with scientists?
10 We could not calculate a non-response rate for this question; thus, these numbers may actually be 
slightly higher. On the other hand, if selection bias occurred, then the numbers may be slightly lower 
than what we report here.
11 While post-tenure respondents were more likely to have co-authored with scientists or engineers than 
their non-tenured counterparts (62% vs. 41%, respectively), even the proportion of non-tenured respond-
ents was still higher than we expected.
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− 0.209, p  < 0.005; for co-PI, B: − 0.204, p < 0.006). It is important to remember 
that our sample likely overrepresents post-tenure philosophers of science, so these 
percentages may not be representative of philosophy of science more generally (that 
is, taking into account non-tenured scholars, who are less likely to have formally 
collaborated with scientists). Regardless, this still suggests that philosophers are 
more collaborative than many may assume.
As we saw with participants’ dissemination efforts, well over half of respondents 
(71.6%) considered their collaborations with scientists to be successful, and almost 
all (96.8%) said they were at least a little bit successful (Fig. 9). Notably, non-tenured 
respondents were less likely to report their collaborations as successful (B: − 0.201, 
p < 0.040). We did not find differences in ratings of success for any other groups.
To assess what sorts of challenges philosophers of science face when doing col-
laborative work, we listed several barriers we thought might be prevalent and asked 
participants whether each was an actual barrier they experienced (and if so, whether 
it was a minor or significant barrier). We also asked them to share additional bar-
riers they faced that the survey did not already capture. Figure 10 shows the list of 
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Fig. 9  Do you think your collaboration efforts were successful?
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Fig. 10  Which of the following, if any, have you actually experienced as a barrier to collaborating with 
scientists?
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barriers, in descending order of significance.12 Interestingly, lack of time was again 
the most significant barrier overall. Lack of recognition was much less of a bar-
rier than we expected, though it was a much more significant barrier for those with-
out tenure, as discussed below. Note that we added additional barriers we suspected 
might be at work (e.g., lack of funding) but which we did not include in the section 
on dissemination.
Our statistical analysis revealed several between-group differences when it came 
to experiencing certain types of barriers (see Table 3 for a simplified chart summa-
rizing the significant differences and their effect sizes). As we saw in our analyses of 
the barriers to broader dissemination, those without tenure were less likely to rate 
lack of time as a more significant barrier than were those who had received tenure 
(B: − 0.300, p < 0.041). However, those without tenure were more likely to report 
lack of recognition as a significant barrier (B: 0.356, p < 0.014). In particular, for 
non-tenured respondents: 27.3% said it was a substantial barrier, 30.3% said it was 
a minor barrier, and 42.4% said it was not a barrier to collaborating with others. For 
post-tenure participants, the results were: 12.7% substantial barrier, 20.6% minor 
barrier, and 66.7% not a barrier.
The only other barrier for which we found differences was lack of scientific knowl-
edge. As we would expect, those with more scientific training were less likely to report 
this as a barrier, though the effect size was relatively small (B: − 0.062, p < 0.031). 
Interestingly, lack of scientific knowledge was much less likely to be reported as a bar-
rier by those who identified as feminist philosophers of science (B: 0.412, p < 0.020), 
and in fact was the largest effect size for all the barriers to collaboration. We detected 
no differences for lack of funding, lack of interest on the part of scientists, lack of 
opportunities, or lack of collaborative skills. (While we did detect a difference between 
pre- and post-tenure respondents for lack of publication venues, the fit of our model 
was just below the threshold of what we considered to be acceptable.)
In addition to asking about actual barriers that participants experienced, we asked 
about barriers they perceived to exist for others in the field (see Fig. 11).13
12 Note that these numbers represent the percentages of those who responded to the question. Our 
response rate for the questions about barriers was about 85% of those who completed the survey.
Table 3  Effect Sizes for Between-Group Differences Regarding Barriers to Collaboration
Lack of time Lack of recogni-
tion
Lack of pub. 
venues
Lack of sci. 
knowledge
Tenure (pre-tenure) − 0.30 + 0.36 + 0.30
Gender (women)
Level of science training − 0.06
General POS (vs. phil. of 
special sciences)
Feminist philosophy − 0.41
13 The response rates for questions about perceived barriers were lower than they were for other ques-
tions (roughly 75–80%, depending on the particular barrier). Again, note that the numbers represented in 
the figure only include those who responded.
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Our results illustrated several interesting findings. First, for every single barrier 
we listed, participants rated perceived barriers as more significant than actual barri-
ers. Second, with respect to lack of recognition in particular, about half of the par-
ticipants rated it more highly as a perceived barrier than an actual one, while the 
other half rated it the same whether it was a perceived or actual barrier; notably, not 
one participant rated lack of recognition more highly as an actual barrier than as a 
perceived one. We also looked at the size of the gap between perceived and actual 
barriers when it came to lack of recognition and found that there were no statisti-
cally significant differences between tenured and non-tenured participants (though 
a larger sample size might reveal such a difference). We thought it was important 
to look at this particular barrier in more detail given the attention to disciplinary 
reward structure as one of the major barriers to doing broadly engaged work (e.g., 
Fehr and Plaisance 2010); we discuss this finding in more detail in Sect. 4.
The third finding worth highlighting is that the rank order of barriers differed for 
perceived barriers compared with actual barriers. For example, while lack of scien-
tific knowledge was almost last on the list of actual barriers, it was rated as one of 
the most highly significant perceived barriers (9% rated it as a significant barrier for 
themselves, while 42.9% perceived it to be significant for others). Similarly, lack 
of interest from scientists was rated as a much more significant perceived barrier 
compared with the actual barriers reported by participants (28% rated it as an actual 
significant barrier, and 44.7% as a perceived one). Notably, this suggests that phi-
losophers of science might believe that other philosophers of science are less knowl-
edgeable about science or that scientists are less interested in philosophy than may 
actually be the case.
Finally, we asked participants whether they thought philosophy of science, as a 
discipline, actually values and rewards philosophers collaborating with scientists, as 
well as the extent to which they thought it should be valued (Fig. 12).
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In general, the results were similar to what we found for dissemination: most 
(76.1%) thought collaboration was undervalued by the discipline, and almost no one 
(two people) thought it should be valued less than it is (Fig. 13). Again, these num-
bers were significantly higher than we expected.
The only between-group differences we found on these survey items were for sci-
ence training, where those with more science training were slightly less likely to say 
that collaboration with scientists is actually valued (B: − 0.077, p < 0.025). Interest-
ingly, we did not find any differences with respect to how much participants thought 
it should be valued.
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Fig. 12  To what extent do you think philosophy of science, as a discipline, actually values and rewards 
collaboration with scientists?
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Fig. 13  To what extent do you think philosophy of science, as a discipline, should value and reward col-
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3.3  Goals and obligations of philosophy of science
In the last substantive section of the survey, we asked participants about what they 
thought the goals of philosophy of science ought to be, as well as what obligations, 
if any, they thought philosophy of science has as a community. We listed eight pos-
sible goals and solicited suggestions for additional goals. For each goal, we asked 
respondents whether they thought it was an essential goal, a good goal but not 
essential, an acceptable goal, or whether it should not be a goal of the discipline.14 
The list of goals can be found in Fig. 14, with those rated more ‘essential’ at the top 
and those as less ‘essential’ or important at the bottom. Interestingly, for all eight of 
the goals we listed, no more than 4.5% of respondents said it should not be a goal.
As with our other survey questions, we conducted a statistical analysis to deter-
mine if there were any differences among groups. For five of the goals, we found 
no statistically significant differences. These were: analyzing concepts, methods, 
assumptions, and/or inferences in science; exposing ethically or epistemically prob-
lematic science; having an impact on the epistemic aspects of scientific research; 
having an impact on the moral, social, or political aspects of scientific research; and 
enhancing public understanding of science. For the other three goals, the only vari-
able that predicted a stronger endorsement of a particular goal was identifying as a 
feminist philosopher of science. These were: addressing socially relevant research in 
science, such as race and IQ (B: 0.590, p < 0.004; identifying social values in scien-
tific research (B: 0.588, p < 0.002); and helping policymakers make use of scientific 
research (B: 0.540, p < 0.007).15 There were no goals for which gender, career stage, 
or amount of scientific training was associated with the strength of the response.
Next, we asked what obligations, if any, participants thought philosophy of sci-
ence has as a community. This question was motivated by a discussion in Fehr and 
Plaisance (2010) about whether philosophy of science has extra-disciplinary obliga-
tions, as we were curious what most members of the discipline thought about this 
issue (see Fig.  15). The responses to this question were quite surprising. In each 
case, over half of participants agreed that philosophy of science, as a discipline, 
has an obligation to ensure philosophical work has an impact on science, to address 
socially relevant issues in science, and to ensure the discipline has a positive impact 
on society. While we expected a few respondents to endorse extra-disciplinary obli-
gations for the discipline, we certainly did not expect those endorsements to be so 
high. Unfortunately, our statistical models for this question did not have good fit and 
thus we do not know if there were any significant differences between groups.
Finally, we asked participants to what extent they agreed with the statement, “phi-
losophy of science has no obligations to communities outside the discipline.” The 
majority of respondents (76.9%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, 
while only a few (13.8%) agreed or strongly agreed that philosophy of science has 
14 Our response rate was about 95–97.5% for each question we asked.
15 It is interesting to note that identifying as a feminist philosopher of science was associated with 
stronger endorsements of several goals, but was not associated with a higher likelihood of having tried to 
disseminate one’s work more broadly or how often one collaborated with others.
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no extra-disciplinary obligations. As we discuss below, since obligations come with 
responsibilities to fulfill them, this finding suggests that philosophy of science ought to 
find ways to assess its broader impact, as well as to increase that impact if necessary.
4  Discussion
4.1  An emerging picture of philosophy of science
Overall, our survey paints a picture of philosophy of science as a more engaged 
enterprise than some may assume it to be. Many philosophers of science express 
interest in taking a more engaged approach to their work; the majority think we 
ought to value broader dissemination and collaboration more highly; and over half 
believe the discipline has an obligation to ensure it has a broader impact. The data 
also demonstrate that philosophers of science have been successfully collaborat-
ing with scientific communities, policymakers, and others in a variety of ways. We 
were particularly surprised at how many participants had co-authored peer-reviewed 
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Analyzing concepts, methods, assumptions, and/or inferences in science
To what extent do you think the following should or should not be goals of philosophy of science?
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Fig. 14  To what extent do you think the following should or should not be goals of philosophy of sci-
ence?
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Address socially relevant issues in science
Which of the following do you think philosophy of science, 
as a community, has an obligation to do?
Strongly agree Agree Neutal Disagree Strongly disagree
Fig. 15  Which of the following do you think philosophy of science, as a community, has an obligation to 
do?
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manuscripts with scientists: about 55% overall and just over 40% for those without 
tenure. It would be interesting to see how these figures compare with philosophy 
more generally regarding co-authorship with non-philosophers.
These findings align with what we heard in our interviews, where many philoso-
phers of science emphasized the fruitfulness of their extra-disciplinary collabora-
tions (some actually told us that their work with scientists and policymakers was 
amongst the most meaningful work they had done). Furthermore, as we demonstrate 
elsewhere, there is evidence to suggest that philosophers’ broader impacts are much 
more likely to come from face-to-face engagement with other communities than 
by publishing in philosophy journals alone (see Plaisance et al. 2019). Our citation 
study revealed something similar: for the most part, when it comes to citing pub-
lications by philosophers of science, scientists tend to cite those publications that 
appear in science journals, while other philosophers are more likely to cite publica-
tions appearing in philosophy journals (McLevey et al. 2018). This lack of discipli-
nary cross-over suggests that disseminating one’s work to scientific communities is 
essential for philosophers of science who wish to have their work taken up in scien-
tific domains.
While many philosophers of science have been successful engaging other com-
munities, significant barriers to broader engagement remain. For one, the survey 
data indicated that men were much more likely than women to have tried to dis-
seminate their work to scientists. At the same time, we didn’t find differences when 
it came to the value men and women placed on having scientists read or make use 
of their work, nor their perceptions of success. Women, however, were much more 
likely to cite time as a barrier. It is possible that women have other professional 
commitments that leave them with less time to disseminate their work more broadly 
(indeed, as we discuss in Sect. 4.3, many studies suggest that there are higher expec-
tations for women when it comes to teaching and service, leaving them with less 
time for their scholarship). Regardless of gender, lack of time was the largest barrier 
for our sample overall. This barrier may be especially salient when disseminating 
one’s work to or collaborating with others outside philosophy. Our interview data 
indicated that both can be quite time consuming. Publishing in non-philosophy jour-
nals, for instance, requires learning the writing and publishing norms of other disci-
plines, while cross-disciplinary collaboration often requires a significant time invest-
ment to understand others’ disciplinary perspectives (Thagard 2006). Those without 
tenure can’t always risk the reduced credit that often comes with interdisciplinary 
and/or collaborative work, especially when that work takes more time.
Barriers to doing more engaged work are definitely significant for some (we dis-
cuss strategies for addressing them in Sect. 4.3). However, the survey data also sug-
gest that these barriers may not be as strong as many have assumed: in every case, we 
saw that perceived barriers were viewed as being more significant than actual ones. 
This held true even for non-tenured respondents. Moreover, when it came to lack of 
recognition, not one respondent rated it more highly as an actual barrier than a per-
ceived one. So, what might be driving these discrepancies? In Sect. 4.2, we consider 
a few likely alternatives, followed by strategies for addressing them in Sect. 4.3.
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4.2  Explaning the gap
Our survey data indicate that engaged work is both relatively common and signifi-
cantly valued by many philosophers of science; yet, the dominant narrative seems 
to be that engaged philosophy of science is in the minority and is undervalued by 
most members of the discipline.16 We suggest four possible explanations for this 
discrepancy.
First, of course, it is possible that our survey data do not accurately represent the 
views of most scholars in the field and that the perceptions of barriers and the minor-
ity status of engaged philosophy of science are correct. As we noted above, it is not 
possible for us to determine exactly how representative our survey is nor rule out any 
selection bias. The fact that our survey asked about ‘the relationship between phi-
losophy of science and scientific domains’ may have increased the chance that those 
who value engaged work responded to our survey. If such a selection bias occurred, 
then our data may overrepresent those views and distort the overall picture of phi-
losophers’ attitudes, values, and experiences. While we acknowledge this potential 
bias, we don’t believe these findings are a complete distortion of the discipline given 
the alignment between our survey results, interview data, citation data, and a related 
but independent study discussed below. In other words, we believe the emerging pic-
ture of a relatively engaged philosophy of science has good support. Assuming this 
picture is generally accurate, then, we consider three additional possibilities.
The most optimistic possibility is that many philosophers of science are overes-
timating the barriers to doing broadly engaged work and underestimating the extent 
to which others value it. This is consistent with the gap we found between perceived 
and actual barriers and the fact that the majority of respondents agreed that both 
extra-disciplinary dissemination and cross-disciplinary collaboration ought to be 
valued more than they currently are. Interestingly, another recent study also found 
that philosophers in general—not just philosophers of science—value extra-discipli-
nary engagement. In her (2017) study on “The Well-Being of Philosophy,” Valerie 
Tiberius asked philosophers what they value about philosophy as a discipline and 
what type of work they think is important.17 Tiberius found strong support for inter-
disciplinary approaches and “moderate support for the idea that philosophy should 
engage with the ‘real world’” (2017, p. 72). Thus, it might be the case that those 
who think engaged work is not “real philosophy,” or shouldn’t be counted for tenure 
and promotion, are actually the ones in the minority.
While this possibility has merit, the fact remains that several philosophers of 
science report significant barriers to doing engaged work, ranging from a lack of 
16 Frodeman and Briggle (2016), for instance, claim that “field philosophy” is in the minority. While 
it seems that their claim is in tension with our findings, it is possible that field philosophy captures a 
stronger form of engagement than what we asked about in the survey. This suggests a need for further 
work to tease apart different types of engagement, which we have begun to do by asking survey respond-
ents to list different ways of collaborating with others.
17 Tiberius’s paper is based on her Presidential Address at the Central Division of the American Phil-
osophical Association meeting in 2017, which can be freely accessed online: https ://blog.apaon line.
org/2017/04/11/the-well-being -of-philo sophy /.
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interest on the part of  scientists to a reward structure that disincentivizes crossing 
disciplinary boundaries. Many of our interviewees shared stories of colleagues say-
ing that engaged work didn’t count as “real philosophy.” Regardless of how preva-
lent such disciplinary boundary policing actually is—and there is no question that it 
happens—even a few dismissive remarks can have lasting effects. In fact, research in 
psychology, sociology, and medicine shows that people’s beliefs significantly shape 
their behaviors (e.g., Crum and Phillips 2015). As one of our colleagues aptly put it, 
perceived barriers can become actual barriers to doing certain kinds of work.18
A third and related possible explanation for this gap is that those who devalue 
engaged approaches are in the minority, but they comprise a powerful minority—
one that includes members of departmental hiring committees, chairs of tenure and 
promotion committees, editors of top-tiered journals, and/or referees for highly-
ranked journals in the field. As Fehr and Plaisance (2010) point out, such ‘gatekeep-
ers’ can play a substantial role in shaping the culture and norms of philosophy of 
science, and philosophy more generally, where norms shape actual practices. As an 
example, Vaesen and Katzav (2019) demonstrate how the policies of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) in the 1950s and 1960s substantially favored philosophi-
cal work that embraced the ‘value-free ideal’ of science.
The final explanation we consider is that people may be more willing to endorse 
abstract values than they are to advocate, support, or even be open to particular 
strategies that instantiate such values. Social scientists typically refer to this as the 
‘value-action gap’ or the ‘attitudinal fallacy’. Tiberius found compelling evidence 
of this gap in her survey. Statements endorsing engaged or interdisciplinary work 
received strong support, while “the item that received the lowest support was the 
very practical question about whether publications in non-philosophy journals 
should be given equal weight” (Tiberius 2017, p. 72). As Tiberius puts it, “people 
are (a little bit) more in favor of diversity, interdisciplinarity, and engagement in 
the abstract than they are in favor of particular strategies for promoting these val-
ues. I would predict that this difference will be bigger when it comes to taking real 
action so that if we could measure how many people actually do give credit to pub-
lic engagement in promotion cases, we would see a smaller number than we do for 
those who report in the survey that they favor doing this” (p. 73).
Assuming Tiberius is right, many philosophers of science (and philosophers 
more generally) face a tension between their goals and values, on the one hand, and 
typical training and reward structures, on the other.19 These structures can disincen-
tivize engaged approaches, such that individuals feel they must “wait until tenure” 
to do broadly engaged or collaborative work. Our survey and interview data suggest 
that those who already have tenure do not view the disciplinary reward structure as 
much of a barrier, though that may be of little consolation to junior scholars. Even 
still, tenured scholars who do engaged work may be less likely to be promoted or 
hold positions of power in the discipline. This can reinforce the view that such work 
18 We thank Carla Fehr for this particular phrasing.
19 There are exceptions to this for the lucky few who are trained in and hired by departments that value 
and reward engaged work, exemplified by institutions like Michigan State University and the University 
of Waterloo.
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is of ‘lower status’—and it can perpetuate the existence of a powerful minority that 
considers engaged work to be less valuable (or even less “philosophical”) than do 
other members of the discipline. Indeed, a recent analysis of the history of the Phi-
losophy of Science Association indicates that its own mission used to be more in 
line with engaged approaches (Douglas 2016; see also Howard 2009). Even today, 
Frodeman and Briggle found that “extra-disciplinary efforts, that is, the ability to 
attract funding, engage in applied research, or publish outside of philosophy journals 
continued to rank at the bottom of the criteria for tenure and promotion” (2016, p. 
42). This may explain why a significant proportion of philosophers of science agree 
that the discipline has an obligation to do broadly engaged work and yet we hear that 
some discourage their graduate students from doing so. In these instances, supervi-
sors may believe engaged philosophy of science is important but that junior schol-
ars ought to focus on more traditional work before broadening their approaches. 
Whether or not this position is a well justified one is open to debate.
4.3  Strategies for aligning values and actions
Given the considerations discussed above, how might philosophers of science—and 
philosophers more generally—address these apparent gaps?
We can start by recognizing that there is already a lot of excellent work that falls 
under the heading of ‘engaged philosophy of science’. This includes, but is not 
limited to, making one’s philosophical work accessible to those outside the disci-
pline, collaborating with scientists, working with policymakers to draft new legisla-
tion, and enhancing public understanding of science via popular articles and blog 
posts (see Fehr and Plaisance (2010) for additional examples). Also, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that there is at least some support for this work on individual, 
community, and institutional levels. At the individual level, our interviews evince 
examples of senior philosophers of science supporting colleagues who wish to take 
a more engaged approach to their work. At the community level, organizations like 
SRPoiSE and JCSEPHS provide venues for engaged scholars to discuss their work 
and build their professional network. At the institutional level, places like Michigan 
State University have developed structures that support and reward interdisciplinary 
and public scholarship; examples include the Center for Interdisciplinarity and the 
Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, the latter of which is itself designed to enhance com-
munication across disciplines.
To further improve the alignment between the goals of ensuring broader impacts 
of philosophical work and the specific practices which support them, philosophers of 
science must first be able to recognize where these gaps exist; we hope the findings 
presented here will aid in that endeavor. Second, closing this gap requires continued 
implementation of effective strategies (such as those listed above), and the develop-
ment of other ways to actively support and/or participate in efforts to broaden the 
impact of philosophy of science.20
20 One of the goals of our interviews is to identify best practices for doing engaged philosophy of sci-
ence and to provide specific case studies from which others can learn.
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Tiberius herself suggests strategies philosophers can use to embody the values 
many endorse. These include: recognition for philosophical work that has a positive 
impact on other communities (e.g., through departmental awards), making public 
declarations about the value of such work (which Tiberius herself did as part of her 
Presidential Address at the 2017 meeting of the Central Division of the APA), and 
advocating for concrete ways to support broadly engaged work in tenure and promo-
tion guidelines (Tiberius 2017). Moreover, it helps to view work that carefully ana-
lyzes the state of our field as serious scholarship, as Frodeman and Briggle mention 
in their (2016) book. Additional research is needed to determine the strategies that 
are most likely to be effective and how best to implement them. It would also help to 
identify which strategies would receive broad support from others in the discipline, 
and determine who is in a position to execute them. This latter part is essential—for, 
if the majority of philosophers support particular changes but no one in a position to 
do so takes action, then change is unlikely to occur.
These strategies have the potential to broaden the conception and reach of philos-
ophy of science (and philosophy more generally), and to do so at a time when phi-
losophy’s relevance is unfortunately in question.21 Such strategies can also help phi-
losophy of science meet what some think are obligations of the discipline (recall that 
over half of respondents thought that philosophy of science, as a community, has an 
obligation to ensure it has an impact on science and to benefit society). However, we 
are not suggesting that more traditional work in philosophy of science (e.g., work 
that grapples with issues like realism vs. anti-realism and/or that is published wholly 
within philosophical venues) should be valued less than it is, nor that engaged phi-
losophy of science, in whatever form it might take, is more valuable than traditional 
approaches.
We also want to stress that supporting engaged approaches to philosophy of sci-
ence, and philosophy more generally, has the potential to benefit philosophy itself. 
As some scholars have demonstrated, engaging scientific communities, policymak-
ers, and others can open up new avenues for philosophical research (Tuana 2010) and 
shed light on traditional topics in philosophy of science (Douglas 2010). Moreover, 
support for diverse types of scholarship can enhance support for diverse practition-
ers, especially underrepresented groups such as women and people of color (Dotson 
2012). As our own survey demographics (and those of the American Philosophical 
Association and Philosophy of Science Association) attest, there is a serious lack of 
diversity in academic philosophy (Haslanger 2008). Sean Valles brings attention to 
this problem and highlights the fact that philosophers of color face particular risks 
when doing non-traditional forms of work. As he points out, philosophers of color 
(and women) are already asked to do more mentoring and service work and thus 
have less time for research; therefore, when it comes time to choosing what sorts 
of scholarship to pursue, they often must be more strategic with their approaches 
21 Philosophers are not limited to broader engagement via their research. As mentioned earlier, one of 
the more effective pathways to impact is via the classroom (see Plaisance et al. 2019 for a detailed dis-
cussion about the best avenues for broader impacts).
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(Valles 2017).22 This is consistent with our finding that although women were just 
as interested as men in doing engaged work, they were much less likely to have tried 
to disseminate their work to scientists and were more likely to cite lack of time as 
a barrier to doing so. By finding ways to more significantly and concretely support 
engaged work (e.g., with clear guidelines for how collaborative work is counted in 
tenure and promotion documents), we can reduce the risks that underrepresented 
philosophers face, especially when they do not have the security of tenure. In doing 
so, however, we must be careful not to put the burden of change on already margin-
alized groups, which can easily occur (Dotson 2012). We encourage further conver-
sations about how to implement strategies for support, along with identifying which 
community members are in the best position to be the motivating force behind them.
4.4  A caveat regarding the culture of justification
Finally, we wish to acknowledge a potential downside of our research. Our goal with 
this paper was to develop a statistical portrait of the discipline in terms of the views, 
attitudes, and experiences of philosophers of science with respect to engaged work. 
In doing so, we risk inadvertently contributing to what Kristie Dotson calls the ‘cul-
ture of justification’, which privileges “legitimation as an assessment tool for appro-
priate disciplinary conduct” (2012, p. 7). While we certainly do not intend to contrib-
ute to or reinforce justification norms, we do think it is valuable to demonstrate that 
there appears to be more support for engaged work than many assume. Furthermore, 
our larger research project seeks to identify the conditions that facilitate and block 
the pursuit of engaged work, as well as strategies for improving those conditions. To 
accomplish this, we think it is important to understand the various attitudes and expe-
riences of members of the discipline. As Dotson herself points out, “justifying norms 
[can be] falsely taken to be commonly held and univocally relevant” (2012, p. 26), 
and our survey data suggests that the norms and values that appear to be dominant 
may in fact be in the minority. By encouraging scholars to tease apart the various 
types of engaged approaches and the contributions they make, we support Dotson’s 
call for a “culture of praxis,” where “validation is determined according to contribu-
tion,” and thus “need not be understood according to a legitimation narrative” (2012, 
p. 17). Rather than philosophers of science having to justify the engaged work they 
do as “real philosophy”, they can instead focus on the contributions they make to 
their target audience (which may, of course, include philosophers themselves).
4.5  Conclusion
Overall, the results of our survey make us cautiously optimistic that there is growing 
support for broadly engaged work. The results suggest that a majority of philoso-
phers of science are interested in and value disseminating their work more broadly 
22 There are several studies documenting the extra burden placed on women and racial minorities with 
respect to service work and various types of invisible labor. Joseph and Hirshfield (2011) discuss this 
in terms of the ‘cultural taxation’ of faculty of color, while Pyke (2015) examines the ways institutional 
structures make it difficult for women to ‘just say no to service’.
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and/or collaborating with others outside the discipline. At the same time, however, 
other scholarship (e.g., Frodeman and Briggle 2016; Tiberius 2017), as well as our 
own interview data, indicate that there is a significant gap between what philoso-
phers say they value when asked and what they actually value when making deci-
sions about how to train graduate students, whom to hire, and what sorts of work 
to count in favor of tenure and promotion. We hope this project encourages further 
conversation about how best to address this gap.
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